

# Social Influence and Actor Heterogeneity

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My voice and throat are not well.

But ... you can read!

That even goes quicker than how I could talk about it.

My pantomime skills are limited.

Let me try to guide you silently through the slides.

## Coevolution of Networks and Behavior

The stochastic actor-oriented model was elaborated to study the co-evolution of networks and behavior (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson, *Soc. Meth.*, 2010).

This is a methodology with the purpose of estimating and testing social influence in a dynamic setting, while controlling for homophilous and other behavior-dependent selection of network partners.

Note: social influence is understood here as influence of network ties & position on individual behavior and performance.

What are the threats to such inferences?

To what extent can such results be causally interpreted?  
(and alternative explanations excluded!)

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- 2 Proof of concept of 'fixed effect estimator', which provides a bit of protection against alternative explanations.

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recall the distinction between *experimental*  
and *observational* studies:

in experimental studies,  
the main 'independent' variables  
are under control of the researcher;

in observational studies,  
the main 'independent' variables are observed,  
without control, in the setting of the data collection.

Methods and models for causal inference tend to focus on experimental studies as the ideal design: *'no [evidence for] causation without experimentation'*.

The counterfactual model

developed by Paul Holland and Donald Rubin

(‘what would have happened

if the treatment had been different?’)

is the most well-known and most fruitful approach here.

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Studies about causal inference in observational studies

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Shalizi & Thomas (*SMR* 2011):  
'disentangling' influence and selection  
cannot be done without depending on model assumptions.

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## Provisional conclusion:

⇒ The paradigm that idealizes experiments can be helpful for making the point that social influence exists<sup>1</sup>, but is of limited importance for finding out the finer structure of how social influence operates.

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*But then –*

*how to make inferential progress about causation?*

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Sir Ronald Fisher: **Make your theories elaborate.**

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Sir David Cox ( *JRSS-A* 1992): important is  
“an explicit notion  
of an underlying process or understanding  
at an observational level that is **deeper than  
that involved in the data under immediate analysis**”.

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- 1 robust dependence;  
(across situations; not disappearing when controlling for alternative explanations)
- 2 consequence of manipulation;  
(as in experimental research; 'counterfactual' approach)
- 3 generative process:  
mechanism more fundamental than the observed association.

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(why, when, how will actors influence & be influenced?)

⇒ fancy 'causal statistical analysis' will not help a lot.

## 2. Unobserved Heterogeneity: Fixed Effect Estimator

But now, let us think nevertheless about how statistical methods might be able to help.

An important type of deviation from assumptions in many longitudinal models is

**unobserved heterogeneity:**

here, this amounts to unknown differences between the social actors.

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An alternative possibility is that the ties were *first* formed based on an unobserved variable  $V$  that *later* leads to development of  $Z$ .

For example: friendship formation could be based on earlier homophily w.r.t.  $V =$  sensation seeking, that later leads to  $Z =$  antisocial behavior.

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*Can something similar be developed  
for actor-based models for networks & behavior?*

## Proof of concept

Further plan of presentation:

- 1 Small simulation study about sensitivity of 'regular' estimator to non-observed heterogeneity.
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Good conditions for a proof-of-concept study:

- 1 Many waves ( $\Rightarrow$  good estimation of actor effects);
- 2 Few actors ( $\Rightarrow$  limited computing time).

## General setup 'simulated reality'

- 1 Waves  $0, 1, \dots, M = 10$ ;  
period  $t_0 - t_1$  is used to set the stage,  
the analysed waves are  $t_1, \dots, t_M$ .
- 2 Actors  $1, \dots, n = 30$ .
- 3 Dependent variables:  
Network  $X$ , Behavior  $Z$  with categories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
- 4 Time-constant covariate  $V \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$  (unobserved)
- 5  $X(t_0)$  is random, parameters between  $t_0$  and  $t_1$  include  
homophily of network  $X$  w.r.t.  $V$ ,  
so that  $X(t_1)$  has network autocorrelation w.r.t.  $V$ .
- 6 Also later on homophily on  $V$  in dynamics of  $X$ .
- 7  $V$  has positive effect on dynamics of  $Z$  after  $t_1$ .

E.g.,  $X = \text{Friendsh.}$ ;  $Z = \text{Delinq.}$ ;  $V = \text{Sensation seeking.}$

## Network model:

The initial network  $X(t_1)$  is generated with a strong  $V$ -similarity parameter.

Network dynamics from  $t_1$  to  $t_{10}$  is determined by:

- 1 Rate parameters  $\rho_m^X = 2$  (all periods  $m$ )
- 2 Outdegree effect  $\beta_d^X = -1.8$
- 3 Reciprocity effect  $\beta_{rec}^X = 2$
- 4 Transitive triplets effect  $\beta_{tt}^X = 0.3$
- 5 3-cycles effect  $\beta_{tc}^X = -0.3$
- 6 Z-similarity effect  $\beta_Z^X = 0.5$
- 7  **$V$ -similarity effect  $\beta_V^X = 1$  in data, not in analysis.**

## *Behavior model:*

- 1 Rate parameters  $\rho_m^Z = 1$  (all periods  $m$ )
- 2 Linear tendency effect  $\beta_1^Z = 0$
- 3 Quadratic tendency effect  $\beta_2^Z = 0$
- 4 **Average alter effect  $\beta_{avalt}^Z$** , social influence  
(effect of average of my friends behavior on my behavior)
- 5 **V-effect  $\beta_V^Z$  in data, not in analysis**  
unobserved heterogeneity.

The parameters varied in the simulations are those representing unobserved heterogeneity: they are used in 'simulated reality' but ignored in the data analysis:

- 1  $\beta_{V0}^X$ , the homophily parameter on the unobserved variable  $V$  before the start of observations.
- 2  $\beta_V^Z$ , the effect of the unobserved variable  $V$  on  $Z$ .

The parameter investigated is

- 3 the estimated  $\hat{\beta}_{avalt}^Z$ , the social influence effect,

which is 0 in 'simulated reality', but may be estimated as positive because  $V$  is unobserved.

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has approximately a standard normal distribution;

- 2 For  $\beta_{V0}^X > 0$ , i.e., initial homophily on a variable that later leads to higher  $Z$ , the test for  $\beta_{avalt}^Z$  is positively biased: rejection rate higher than  $\alpha = 0.05$ . This is because the model is misspecified.

This is tested in a very small simulation study.

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Rejection rates for the true null hypothesis  $\beta_{\text{avalt}}^Z = 0$  with  $\alpha = 0.05$  (one-sided), in case of unobserved heterogeneity.

$\beta_{V0}^X$	$\beta_V^Z$	rejection rate
2	2	.54
1	2	.37
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Conclusion: **Yes**.

(It should have been 0.05.)

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2	0	.006
1	0	.003
0	0	.007

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Conclusion: **Yes but conservative.**  
(It should have been 0.05.)

## Potential Solution: Fixed effects estimator

The fixed effects estimator for behavior is the regular estimator for a model that has actor-specific effects (dummy variables) for all actors in the model for behavior.

These actor-specific effects absorb all time-constant differences between the actors, so that conclusions about social influence are made only based on within-actor over-time comparisons, excluding any information of between-actor comparisons.

This must lead to considerable loss of power, like always is the case for fixed effects estimators.

The model specification for the estimation model for behavior includes:

- 1 Rate parameters  $\rho_m^Z$  (all periods  $m$ )
- 2 Linear tendency effect  $\beta_1^Z$
- 3 Quadratic tendency effect  $\beta_2^Z$
- 4 **Average alter effect  $\beta_{avalt}^Z$**  (social influence)
- 5 Effects  $\beta_{act(i)}^Z$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n - 1$  of dummy variables for actors (control for unobserved heterogeneity).

In linear models, fixed effects estimators can be implemented more easily; here we must work with a model with a very large number of parameters.

For this large number of waves and moderate number of actors, it runs with few problems.

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Conclusion: **Pretty good but not totally.**  
(It should have been 0.05.)

Note that the estimation model still is misspecified because it ignores the continuing homophily w.r.t.  $V$  (part of the network model, not the behavior model).

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Rejection rates for the false null hypothesis  $\beta_{avalt}^Z = 0$  with  $\alpha = 0.05$  (one-sided), for the regular estimator and the fixed effects estimator.

$\beta_{V0}^X$	$\beta_V^Z$	$\beta_{avalt}^Z$	rej. r. regular	rej. r. FEE
1	0	1	0.88	0.24

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Conclusion: **Yes**.

(0.24 much less than 0.88.)

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2. Like all fixed effect estimators, it gives protection only against specific kinds of unobserved heterogeneity: differences between actors that are constant over time.
3. The loss of power seems considerable; and that in the situation where high power for discovering social influence requires quite a lot of data.

*More is to follow; but the perspective is not very bright, underlining the necessity of 'understanding at a deeper level' and the limitations of the attempts of statistically fixing the issue.*

Yes/No questions are preferred.