

Overview Overview Research together with Malick Faye and Julien Brailly (Sciences Po, Paris and Swinburne University, Melbourne) ⇒ Example of a 'multilevel' network where actors are nested in villages, i.e., the node set has a nested structure: 'levels'. ⇒ Within-village and between-village relations can be different in nature. ⇒ There is additional nesting structure: individuals nested in households nested in compounds nested in villages: 4 levels. ⇒ Variables can have different meaning depending on the level, cf. the ecological fallacy.

Water resources in 7 villages in Senegal

The research setting is a group of 7 villages in rural Senegal. These villages have a common water supply resource (deep-well). This resource is managed by a board elected by the villagers according to rules of equal representation.

Of the villages, two are Fulani (nomadic cattle breeders) and five are in large majority Wolof (sedentary agriculture).

The inhabitants live in households (families) nested in compounds (extended families).

A network survey was held in 2010 and 2015 among all inhabitants. The data analyzed here are of the 406 respondents for whom data is available for both waves (70 % response).

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Water resources in 7 villages in Senegal Dependent variables
Dependent variable
Many dependent variables can be defined for this rich data set.
We focus here on the most important network variable
• Sociability network (advice, discussion, help, potential loans, visiting)
differentiated: within and between villages.
The individuals lived in 140 households,
and these were grouped in 55 compounds (extended families).

Within-village and between-village networks

Relations within villages are of a different nature than between villages, although the same name generators were used.

This could be represented by covariate 'same village', but perhaps more transparently

by separating this as two dependent networks.

Define two networks W = 'within' and B = 'between', composed of sociability ties within and between villages, with structural zero blocks for the between-village and within-village dyads, respectively.


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Water resources in 7 villages in Senegal Within- and between-village sociability The within and between relations are separated in two dependent networks, with structurally zero blocks. For the within-village network W: V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V_1 V_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 V^2 0 V^2 0 0 0 0 0 V3 0 0 V3 0 0 0 0 V40 0 0 V4 0 0 0 V_5 0 0 0 0 V5 0 0 0 0 0 0 V_6 V_6 0 0 0 V70 0 0 0 0 V7 Block structure for the between-village network W:

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	<i>V</i> 6	V7
V1	(0	V1V2	V1V3	V1V4	V1V5	V1V6	V1V7
V2	V2V1	0	V2V3	V1V4	V2V5	V2V6	V2V7
V3	V3V1	V3V2	0	V1V4	V3V5	V3V6	V3V7
V4	V4V1	V4V2	V4V3	0	V4V5	V4V6	V4V7
V5	V5V1	V5V2	V5V3	V1V4	0	V5V6	V5V7
V6	V6V1	V6V2	V6V3	V1V4	V6V5	0	V6V7
V7	$\bigvee V7V1$	V7V2	V7V7	V1V4	V7V5	V7V6	o /

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


Model specification: sociability

For the W and B networks: within-network structural effects:

- 1. Outdegree, reciprocity
- 2. three degree effects
- 3. transitivity: GWESP
- 4. actor variable: gender
- 5. actor variable: wealth, combined value of harvest, cattle, machines

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With the nesting of individuals in families in extended families, and the definition of wealth as <u>individual</u> wealth, we can make ecological fallacies (multilevel analysis!!!) if we do not also consider wealth at the family level.

Therefore three wealth variables are constructed:

- ► individual wealth
- total family wealth ('household')
- total extended family wealth ('compound')

For each of these, the five-parameter model of Snijders & Lomi (*Network Science*, 2019) is used:

 $V(\text{ego}), V(\text{alter}), V^2(\text{ego}), V^2(\text{alter}), (V(\text{ego}) - V(\text{ego}))^2$

A reasoned stepwise model selection procedure is followed.

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Results	
Results	
Results cover several pages.	
For numerical actor covariates,	
results are reported in figures.	

Effect	par.	(s.e.)	
Within: structure, some covariates			
outdegree	-2.644***	(0.300)	
reciprocity	1.142***	(0.109)	
GWESP	1.059***	(0.075)	
$GWESP\timesreciprocity$	-0.394*	(0.165)	
indegree-popularity	-0.010	(0.019)	
outdegree-activity	-0.076***	(0.014)	
indegree-activity	-0.003	(0.029)	
log distance	-0.231***	(0.016)	
ethnicity (W) alter	0.549†	(0.283)	
ethnicity (W) ego	-0.721*	(0.287)	
same ethnicity	0.435	(0.278)	
gender (M) alter	0.244***	(0.065)	
gender (M) ego	-0.257***	(0.072)	
same gender	0.569***	(0.063)	
[†] $p < 0.1$; [*] $p < 0.05$; ^{**} $p < 0.01$; ^{***} $p < 0.001$;			

Results

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Results		
Effect	par.	(s.e.)
Within: effects from between		
indegree between popularity	0.048	(0.039)
indegree between activity	-0.060	(0.070)
outdegree between popularity	0.027	(0.020)
outdegree between activity	0.002	(0.043)
same B choices	-0.337	(0.521)
mixed BBW closure	1.352	(0.941)
1	**	

[†] p < 0.1; ^{*} p < 0.05; ^{**} p < 0.01; ^{***} p < 0.001;

Results


Effect	par.	(s.e.)		
Between: structure,	ome covariates			
outdegree (density)	-5.386***	(0.421)		
reciprocity	2.067***	(0.394)		
GWESP	1.063	(0.793)		
indegree-popularity	-0.280†	(0.162)		
outdegree-activity	0.172***	(0.031)		
indegree-activity	-0.350	(0.300)		
logDist	-0.707***	(0.205)		
ethnicity (W) alter	0.518*	(0.232)		
ethnicity (W) ego	-0.691***	(0.205)		
same ethnicity	0.955***	(0.217)		
gender (M) alter	0.906***	(0.244)		
gender (M) ego	-0.255	(0.289)		
same gender	0.955***	(0.222)		
[†] $p < 0.1$; [*] $p < 0.05$; ^{**} $p < 0.01$; ^{***} $p < 0.001$;				

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
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
Results		
Effect		(s.e.)
	par.	(s.e.)
Between: effects from Within	1	
indegree within popularity	0.268***	(0.077)
indegree within activity	0.130	(0.122)
outdegree within popularity	-0.211†	(0.120)
outdegree within activity	-0.311†	(0.178)
mixed WBB closure	0.904***	(0.265)
mixed BWB closure	0.053	(0.138)
A		

[†] p < 0.1; ^{*} p < 0.05; ^{**} p < 0.01; ^{***} p < 0.001;



Results Effects of wealth The effects of wealth can best be given through plots of the selection function (i.e., the total contribution of wealth to the evaluation function). Effect sizes have not yet been developed. In the logit scale of the SAOM parameters, the range of the contributions of household and compound wealth to the within-village network selection function is less than 0.36; range of contributions to the between-village network selection function is 2.3 for individual, 1.6 for household, and 2.0 for compound wealth. This implies that the effect of wealth on between-village ties is much larger than for within-village ties.





Results Conclusions of the analysis
Conclusions of the analysis: covariates
1. Rich differences W-B.
2. Covariate gender: homophily W and B , males receive more ties W and B , send fewer ties W ;
3. Covariate age: mainly homophily;
 Covariate wealth, W: depends only on ego for household and compound, with most contacts for egos with medium household wealth and high compound wealth;
 Covariate wealth, B: for individual mainly homophily, most contacts to alters with medium household wealth and from egos with medium compound wealth.
6. Covariate ethnicity: homophily <i>B</i> .

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